Climate change games are
being played for very high stakes. With Arctic ice shrinking, sea levels
rising, weather patterns changing leading to greater storm activity in some
places and prolonged droughts in others, the threshold for serious change
appears close.
The price to cut back on
pollution is high and our politicians are representing our interests if I may
put that politely. Clearly with my thin wallet, my interests aren’t as exciting
as some with much thicker wallets, but when push comes to shove, we would all
like our wallets to grow plumper rather than slimmer. Slimming is for our belly
in the gym so we can fit into our fat cat suits more easily.
Nevertheless we recognize
that the issue is important and many of us thought that in 1997 when the Kyoto
Protocol was announced that we had had serious negotiations leading to a
serious action plan. But the game goes on.
In the Proceedings of the National Academy of
Science, Barrett and Dannenberg have had a look at the business of climate
negotiations from a Games Theory perspective and an uncomfortable perspective
it is (1). It is a serious multiplayer game in which a dangerous change
threshold could be reached if the players don’t cooperate.
Games theory is a fun
activity of many psychologists who set up lab experiments around cooperative
games. The ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’ game is a classic (2). Recall that cooperation means a light
sentence (cost) for both players while betrayal means that the betrayer goes
free (rewarded) and the betrayed gets a heavy sentence (pays a big cost).
Mathematical analysis shows that on repeat plays with a group, the player who
betrays does best. (Psychologist don’t send anyone to jail, they pay out cash
in various amounts.)
When there is a big gain by
cooperating (see the stag hunting game of Rousseau or just the Battle of the
Sexes Game (2)) that is the stable equilibrium setting. That is, the best thing
is cooperation and everybody wins.
Climate change should fit that cooperation
scenario as there is a big gain and a serious loss at that dangerous threshold.
The problem comes into these climate change games as the threshold for disaster
become less well defined. Barrett and Dannenberg crunched numbers and found
that when the dangerous threshold of the games was uncertain, the game switched
from a cooperative win type of game to a Prisoner’s Dilemma result where
betrayal (self-interest) is the winning strategy.
A disappointing result, but
a rationalization for why so many politicians say one thing and do another over
this issue.
- http://www.pnas.org/content/early/2012/10/09/1208417109.abstract
- http://www.econ.uzh.ch/faculty/jgoeree/publications/CG.pdf
